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Excluding Unemployed Workers  
from Job Opportunities:  
Why Disparate Impact Protections Still Matter 
Helen Norton∗ 
Despite our tough economic climate, many employers exclude 
currently unemployed workers from consideration for a wide variety of 
jobs. Examples of such jobs include mechanics, professors, chefs, drivers, 
teachers, lawyers, coaches, service technicians, sign installers, emergency 
services dispatchers, receptionists, freight handlers, restaurant managers, 
paralegals, sales representatives, and executive assistants.
1
 Not only does 
this practice seem cruel and unwise, but under certain circumstances it 
may violate federal antidiscrimination law. 
As the Supreme Court and Congress have long made clear, 
employment practices that impose an unlawful disparate impact—that is, 
measures that disproportionately exclude protected class members from 
job opportunities without adequate justification—frustrate anti-
discrimination objectives in at least two ways. First, employment 
practices that disproportionately disadvantage protected class members 
without any meaningful relationship to successful job performance may 
sometimes conceal an employer’s intent to discriminate.
2
 Second, even 
 
 * Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Colorado 
School of Law. Preferred citation for this Essay: Helen Norton, Excluding Unemployed Workers from 
Job Opportunities: Why Disparate Impact Protections Still Matter, 2011 Hastings L.J. Voir Dire 1. 
 1. See Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Hiring Discrimination Against the Unemployed: Federal 
Bill Outlaws Excluding the Unemployed from Job Opportunities, as Discriminatory Ads Persist 
8–11 (2011); see also Laura Bassett, How Employers Weed Out Unemployed Job Applicants, Others, 
Behind the Scenes, Huffington Post, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/14/ 
unemployed-job-applicants-discrimination_n_809010.html. 
 2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426–30 (1971) (observing that an employer’s 
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absent an employer’s discriminatory intent, employment practices that 
impose a disparate impact often reflect unexamined assumptions and 
stereotypes about the skills and capabilities that predict successful job 
performance.
3
 For these reasons, current-employment requirements 
demonstrate the continuing need for vigorous enforcement of disparate 
impact standards. 
Plaintiffs seeking to prove the existence of illegal disparate impact 
discrimination must start by demonstrating that the challenged practice 
causes an adverse impact based on protected class status.
4
 There are a 
number of ways in which plaintiffs can make such a showing. One 
method is labor-market (or “labor pool”) analysis, which is especially 
appropriate when the challenged practice likely skews the actual 
applicant pool by deterring potential applicants who realize that they 
cannot satisfy the requirement in question.
5
 This would be the case, for 
example, when a job announcement expressly lists “current employment” 
among the requirements for the job: faced with such an announcement, 
many prospective applicants who are not currently employed will simply 
decide not to apply. 
Under this analysis, the qualified labor market consists of those in 
the relevant geographical area (that is, the area from which the employer 
draws workers for the position in question) who otherwise possess the 
relevant job qualifications.
6
 Labor-market analysis compares the 
 
non-job-related tests disproportionately excluded African Americans from jobs that “formerly had 
been filled only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites” 
and thus operated “to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
 3. See id. at 431–32. The Court reasoned that “what is required by Congress is the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Id. at 431. Further, the Court 
reasoned that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring job capability.” Id. at 432.  
 4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (“There is no requirement, however, 
that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the 
characteristics of actual applicants. The application process itself might not adequately reflect the 
actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying 
because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as being discriminatory.”); 
see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977) (“A consistently enforced 
discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are 
unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977). When the job in 
question is entry-level or does not require specialized skills or training as a condition of employment, 
the relevant labor market may be the percentage of adult protected class members in the relevant 
geographical area. Id. at 308 n.13 (“In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes 
on the employer’s work force and the percentage in the general area-wide population was highly 
probative, because the job skill there involved—the ability to drive a truck—is one that many persons 
possess or can fairly readily acquire.”). If the employer recruits workers from across the nation, as 
would likely be the case for certain jobs requiring specialized skills or responsibilities, the relevant 
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selection rate for protected class members in the qualified labor market 
with that of a comparator group in that market. Consider, for example, a 
school located in a certain metropolitan area that requires applicants for 
teaching positions to be currently employed. To determine whether this 
practice has an adverse impact on African Americans, we might compare 
the percentage of African American teachers (those with the requisite 
teaching credential) currently employed in the metropolitan area with 
the percentage of currently employed white teachers in the metropolitan 
area. The plaintiff has established the existence of the requisite adverse 
impact if the difference between those two percentages is statistically 
significant
7
 or satisfies the eighty-percent rule, which finds adverse 
impact upon a showing that the selection rate for protected class 
members under this requirement is less than eighty percent of the 
selection rate for the most successful group.
8
 
Applicant-flow analysis is another method by which plaintiffs may 
show an adverse impact. This method may be more appropriate if the 
employment practice in question is instead used as a screen later in the 
process, for example when an employer does not require current 
employment as a condition of application but instead screens applicants 
who are not currently employed later in the decisionmaking process. 
Applicant-flow analysis compares the selection rate under that 
requirement for protected class members who apply for the position with 
that of the comparator group. Again, if the difference between the two 
percentages is statistically significant or satisfies the eighty-percent rule, 
the plaintiff has established the requisite adverse impact. 
Depending on the relevant demographic data, a current-
employment requirement has the potential to create an adverse impact in 
a number of contexts. For example, as of July 2011, the nationwide 
unemployment rate for African Americans (15.9%) was almost twice 
that of whites (8.1%).
9
 Of course, the outcome of any adverse-impact 
analysis will depend on the job in question, the geographical area from 
 
geographical area could be the entire nation. 
 7.  Courts consider disparities to be statistically significant when the difference between the 
compared percentages (that is, the difference between the actual and expected outcomes) is greater 
than two or three standard deviations, thus greatly reducing the possibility that the disparity can be 
explained by chance. See id. at 308–09 n.14 (“The Court [has] noted that ‘[a]s a general rule for such 
large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than 
two or three standard deviations,’ then the hypothesis that teachers were hired without regard to race 
would be suspect.” (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496–97 (1977))). 
 8. This would be the case, for example, if only sixty percent of the African Americans in the 
applicant pool were currently employed, compared to eighty percent of the whites in the applicant 
pool. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011) (stating that federal enforcement agencies will generally 
consider as evidence of adverse impact a selection rate for protected class members that is less than 
four-fifths of the rate for the group with the highest selection rate). 
 9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—August 
2011, at 4 summary tbl.A (2011). 
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which the employer draws candidates for the job, and the characteristics 
of the relevant labor market and applicant pool.
10
 
A plaintiff who proves that a practice imposes an adverse impact has 
established an actionable violation if the employer (or employment 
agency
11
) then “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.”
12
 Even if the employer so demonstrates, the plaintiff will still 
prevail if he or she can prove the availability of a less discriminatory 
employment practice that achieves the employer’s interest in selecting 
individuals who can successfully perform the job in question.
13
 
By requiring careful examination of employment practices that 
impose a disparate impact on protected class members, along with 
possible alternatives to such practices, federal antidiscrimination law thus 
enhances not only equal access to job opportunities but also a 
commitment to true merit selection. As the Supreme Court has observed, 
“Nothing in the [Civil Rights Act of 1964] precludes the use of testing or 
measuring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has 
forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless 
they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.”
14
 
This attention to unjustified disparities has substantially enhanced 
social welfare by improving the practices used to fill key positions in 
public safety and elsewhere.
15
 Too often employers relied on examinations 
 
 10. Indeed, unemployment rates vary across region and job type. See Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 2009 at 
258 tbl.29 (2010) (finding an unemployment rate of 34.1% for construction workers in the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area, compared to 21.2% for those in the Los Angeles area, and finding a 22.9% 
unemployment rate for construction workers in the Boston metropolitan area, compared to 6.6% for 
those working in the management, business, and financial fields in the Boston area). 
 11. Federal prohibitions on disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination apply to 
employment agencies as well as employers. This means that employment agencies using discriminatory 
practices requested by their client employers remain liable themselves for such discrimination. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful . . . for an employment agency . . . to 
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to 
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.10 (2011) (“The use of an employment agency does not relieve an employer 
or labor organization or other user of its responsibilities under Federal law to provide equal 
employment opportunity or its obligations as a user under these guidelines.”). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B) (“Where two or more selection 
procedures are available which serve the user’s legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship, and which are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the user should use the 
procedure which has been demonstrated to have the lesser adverse impact.”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (holding that even if the employer proves that the challenged 
requirement is sufficiently job related for the position in question, the plaintiff may still prevail by then 
showing that another practice with a less discriminatory impact would also “serve the employer’s 
legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship’”). 
 14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
 15. Psychologists, for example, have found that decisionmakers frequently define merit for 
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and other devices without ensuring that performance on those tests 
actually predicted success on the job.
16
 Reconsidering practices that 
imposed racially disparate impacts led to the creation of selection 
instruments that more accurately identified top performers. As just one 
example, Title VII’s disparate impact provision spurred the development 
of risk assessment centers that more accurately replicate real-world 
emergency and management scenarios and thus better predict public-
safety job performance than other forms of promotional testing like 
multiple-choice tests.
17
 
With this in mind, consider the possible explanations that an 
employer might offer to justify a current-employment requirement and 
some of the questions that arise when considering those justifications. 
Some employers may use current employment as a signal of quality job 
performance, under the theory that those currently employed (especially 
in a tough economy) must be strong performers.
18
 But such a correlation 
is decidedly weak, as there are many reasons why one might be 
unemployed at any time (and especially during a time of economic 
downturn) that have nothing to do with job performance. These reasons 
include, but are not limited to, having been in school or in a training 
program; having to leave a job because of spousal relocation; having lost 
 
specific jobs in ways “congenial to the idiosyncratic strengths of applicants who belong to desired 
groups.” Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify 
Discrimination, 16 Psychol. Sci. 474, 474 (2005). See generally David Dunning et al., A New Look at 
Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories of Success a Product of Motivational Forces? 69 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 58 (1995) (describing how individuals often define merit in a self-serving 
manner by emphasizing criteria consistent with their own credentials); Michael I. Norton et al., 
Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 817 (2004) (finding that 
evaluators strategically emphasized certain performance criteria to justify discriminatory decisions in 
hiring and admissions). For example, one study found that evaluators strategically defined merit in a 
manner that favored male over female applicants when hiring for the job of police chief. Uhlmann & 
Cohen, supra, at 476. Study participants emphasized the importance of education and experience when 
evaluating a male candidate who had strong credentials in those areas, but devalued those same 
qualities when evaluating a male candidate who lacked them. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[I]t is natural 
to assume that the best performers on an employment test must be the best people for the job. But, the 
significance of these principles is undermined when an examination is not fair. As Congress recognized 
in enacting Title VII, when an employment test is not adequately related to the job for which it tests—
and when the test adversely affects minority groups—we may not fall back on the notion that better 
test takers make better employees. The City asks the court to do just that. Regrettably, though, the 
City did not take sufficient measures to ensure that better performers on its examinations would 
actually be better firefighters.”). 
 17. See Winfred Arthur Jr. et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Criterion-Related Validity of Assessment 
Center Dimensions, 56 Personnel Psychol. 125, 145–46 (2003); Barbara B. Gaugler et al., Meta-
Analysis of Assessment Center Validity, 72 J. Applied Psychol. 493, 503 (1987); James R. Huck & 
Douglas W. Bray, Management Assessment Center Evaluations and Subsequent Job Performance of 
White and Black Females, 29 Personnel Psychol. 13, 13–14 (1976). 
 18. See, e.g., Laura Bassett, Employers Continue to Discriminate Against Jobless, Think “The Best 
People are Already Working,” Huffington Post, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/10/08/employers-continue-to-dis_n_756136.html. 
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a job because of a lack of seniority during employer downsizing; having 
lost a job because the employer eliminated an entire division or shut 
down altogether; and having left employment temporarily due to illness, 
injury, disability, pregnancy, or family caregiving responsibilities.
19
 A 
blanket reliance on current employment thus serves as a poor proxy for 
successful job performance. 
As another possibility, some employers may use current 
employment as a proxy for relevant experience. But this also raises 
questions and concerns. First, such a justification is not job related or 
consistent with business necessity with respect to entry-level jobs that 
require no experience or for jobs in which candidates receive relevant 
on-the-job training. Second, even for those jobs that require state-of-the-
art knowledge of rapidly changing technologies or practices, current 
employment may still be an impermissibly blunt instrument for 
evaluating relevant experience and knowledge. More accurate—and less 
discriminatory—alternatives include more individualized assessments, 
such as posing problems or questions in interviews or tests that measure 
relevant contemporary knowledge, as well as asking questions that reveal 
recent experience or recent education and training. For example, the 
candidate may be currently unemployed because he or she has been in 
school, the candidate may have been employed until very recently, or the 
candidate may have used a period of unemployment to receive additional 
education or training. 
Offering still another possibility, some employers might use a 
current-employment requirement simply to discourage applications, or to 
provide a quick and easy mechanism for filtering applications received.
20
 
Such a justification—that the practice facilitates the employer’s speed 
and ease in processing applications—has no relationship to candidates’ 
successful job performance, and thus is not job related for the position in 
question.
21
 
In short, current-employment requirements threaten to exclude 
protected class members from employment disproportionately and 
absent any meaningful connection to merit. In so doing, they undermine 
federal antidiscrimination law and its commitment to ensuring that access 
to job opportunities is free from discrimination in tough economic times 
as well as good. 
 
 19. Even in the unlikely event that an employer or employment agency could establish the 
requisite connection between current employment and job performance, less discriminatory 
alternatives remain available. These include inquiries of the applicant as to whether he or she was ever 
disciplined or terminated for poor performance, as well as reference checks. 
 20. See Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, supra note 1, at 5. 
 21. Of course, employers who seek simply to reduce the number of applications to be processed 
are free to do so in a way that does not impose an adverse impact on protected class members, and 
thus does not trigger a requirement that they justify the practice as job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity. 
